Coming to your PC: the Rudd Desktop Assistant

Remember Clippit, the animated paper clip that would appear and offer assistance when you started using a Microsoft Office application for the first time? It might have impressed some people with its animated stunts, but when it came to delivering the help you needed, all too often it responded with irrelevant answers to your questions. It looked very friendly, but when you wanted to get down to doing serious work it became an annoying, unwelcome intrusion. Now just imagine what it would be like to have a Kevin Rudd variant of this feature running in the background on your PC all the time, because this is in essence what might pop up after downloading and installing the application that the Rudd Labor government just announced would be available for parents seeking protection for their children online.

When Senator Conroy's desktop panic button was launched last week, it was derided by the online community as a waste of taxpayers' money because it was nothing more than a help button which connects the child to resources online—or so they thought. It would be naive to think that this button—reported to cost $73,000 to develop and includes the ability to update itself automatically—will do nothing more in future.

Perhaps the Rudd Labor government intends to quietly dump its unpopular plan for mandatory ISP-level filtering by sneaking in an update for PC-based filtering. However, this is a custom-built application and development is ongoing—not an existing commercial product available off the shelf—so we can only guess what the government plans to do next with its panic button.

The intentions of the Rudd Labor government's ideas for the Internet need close scrutiny, because a picture is emerging of a government obsessed with centralised monitoring and regulation of activity on the Internet. If the government is planning to make ISPs retain the browsing history of Internet users as some people in the industry claim, then it is more out of touch than it seemed at first with its plans for mandatory ISP-level filtering. Internet users can conceal their browsing history via the same methods as those used to circumvent ISP-level filters, such browsing via a Web proxy. It is obvious that they are not listening to expert advice in the development of their policies.

Issues of ISP-level filtering

Simple illustration of the flaws with ISP-level filtering. Call me old-fashioned, but I believe it’s better to tackle the problem at the source. Internet users aren't the only victims of child pornography.

Conroy spun the filter trial, and out came a report fluffier than a Himalayan cat that's been through a clothes drier

Senator Conroy has had more than enough time to provide clarity, substance and certainty on his planned mandatory Internet censorship regime. With each day that passes that their calls for reason, common sense and clarity on this issue are ignored, Australians with legitimate concerns about this policy grow ever more cynical about the ability of their politicians to understand and represent their views on issues relevant to ordinary Australians. In this age many Australians consider the Internet to be fundamental to their every day personal communications, just like the analogue telephone which is being replaced by VOIP, where voice telephony is delivered via the Internet. Many Australians consider this a serious issue that warrants robust and informed debate involving all stakeholders, and for it to be based on fact.

The Enex TestLab report is misleading and has Senator Conroy’s fingerprints all over it. Take for example the feedback from customers on page 28:

Over-blocking
Participants were asked if access was blocked to sites that they thought they should have access to (e.g. to identify perceptions of over-blocking). Only a couple of respondents indicated that they were frequently blocked access to sites they should have had access to, while most respondents reported that they were blocked “possibly once or twice”. A number of users reported they were “unsure” as to whether they had been blocked unnecessarily and some customers commented on the benefit of seeing some “output” of the filters action.

Proponents of the government’s policy might think that this is just collateral damage in the war on child pornography because it appears in the section of the report titled Customer Feedback — Additional Content Filtering, which covers the impact of the optional “family” filter on customers’ experience. We don’t know whether reports of over-blocking and other negative feedback can be attributed to the mandatory filter which was used at the same time for customers who participated in the trial of the filter for optional additional categories. They did not seek feedback from customers who participated in the trial of the mandatory filter alone.

Conroy boasts that the AMCA filter is 100% accurate. It’s just like throwing a net into the ocean, pulling out a few fish and saying “See these fish I’ve caught? It’s 100% accurate at catching these fish.”

You don’t have to embrace libertarianism to see the insanity. The end does not justify the means, especially when evidence that the end will be achieved does not exist. Will it block 5% of child pornography on the Internet? Will it even block 1%? Nobody knows. It’s hard for experts to provide clear answers when they are not provided with clearly defined aims. Also, it’s hard to disprove something that was never proven in the first place. The government has failed to demonstrate that the technology it intends to impose on each and every Australian will be effective in protecting children from child pornography.

How does Senator Conroy plan to filter the web traffic of mobile phones?

Below is the page that is displayed when I browse to www.iplocationtools.com from my BlackBerry in Australia. It displays the IP address and location of the host connecting to the website, which in this case is a proxy located in Canada, the country in which RIM, the maker of BlackBerry smart phones, is based. How does the Rudd Labor government intend to censor the Internet when it accessed through the BlackBerry web browser or any other application that uses a proxy located offshore?

Update: Rudd Labor government censors results from ISP filtering trial

In an earlier post I briefly explained how key results were missing in the Enex TestLab report on the government's live pilot of its proposed ISP-level filtering scheme.

The results of the accuracy testing can be combined into a single table.

No results were published on the percentage of URLs that were blocked on the innocuous list of URLs, as was done for the participants blocking additional content. The results cannot be considered complete without figures providing an indication of the rate of over-blocking that occurred for filters blocking URLs on the ACMA blacklist only.

A filter blocking only those URLs listed on ACMA blacklist should in theory block fewer innocuous sites than a filter blocking additional categories of content as well as the ACMA blacklist. However, the results for filtering the ACMA blacklist only are crucial as ISPs will be required to block the content specified on this list for all Internet users under legislation the federal government intends to introduce into Parliament this year.

While the rate of over-blocking for filters blocking the ACMA blacklist alone is likely to be better, publishing just the results for trials of filters that block both the ACMA blacklist and additional categories of content puts the government in a convenient position when challenged by criticism of the filters' performance. Enex stated in the report that the percentages for the blocking of URLs on the innocuous list of URLs were high:

In terms of over-blocking the results of this trial show that, while an improvement on previous testing levels, this is still considered high.

The government might respond to criticism by stating that less over-blocking will occur with the proposed mandatory filter which will block URLs on the ACMA blacklist without providing any actual figures obtained from tests.

The case is similar with the feedback survey that was carried out for customers of the ISPs involved in the pilot. The customer feedback survey was not issued to customers of ISPs that filtered the ACMA blacklist only, as stated in the report.

Policy motion passed by the Liberal Party of Australia (WA Division) opposing Government censorship of the Internet

The following policy motion (as printed in the Conference Handbook) moved by the Western Australian Union of Liberal Students was debated and passed at the 59^th Annual Western Australian State Conference held on 21 March 2009:

That the Liberal Party of Australia (WA Division), is opposed to all Government censorship of the internet.

Support was emphatic, with no more than 5–10% of conference delegates voting against the policy motion.

ALSF Media Release: Fight the filter!

Published at http://www.alsf.org.au/news.php?n=54:

Wednesday, 16 December, 2009

Fight the filter!

The Australian Liberal Students’ Federation (ALSF) has today slammed the Rudd Labor Government for its proposed internet filter and called on the Coalition to fight the filter.

“There is a grass-roots movement against this policy, and the ALSF is a leading group in that movement,” ALSF President Alex Butterworth said today.

“The ALSF will continue to campaign hard against this oppressive policy, which will limit freedom of speech, slow down internet speeds substantially, and cause an estimated 20 million legitimate sites to be blocked,”

“Rudd promised broadband for all Australians and a computer for every child, and all he is doing is slowing down the internet, slowing down the economy and taking us backwards,”

“Importantly, we need to ask why the filter is even being considered when voluntary filtering packages are already available to those who want them?”

“The filter shows that the oppressive nanny state is alive and well under the Rudd Labor Government,” “Australia will join countries such as Iran, Syria, China and North Korea as one of the few nations where the internet is filtered,” said Mr Butterworth.

Media Enquiries:

Alex Butterworth
+61 418 264 020
abutterworth@alsf.org.au
www.alsf.org.au

Censorship: it's already happening under Kevin Rudd

Actions that the government has already taken to suppress politically unfavourable views raise doubts about Kevin Rudd's motives for implementing mandatory ISP-level filtering. It is unfortunate that these outrageous violations of freedom of speech have received little attention in the media.

When an MP instructed his supporters to contact him to obtain copies of a speech because new regulations issued by the Department of Finance and Deregulation prevented him from distributing material critical of the government, I thought it was only a joke. Unfortunately, it wasn't—so much for deregulation. Luke Simpkins, Federal Member for the Western Australian seat of Cowan, raised this issue in a speech given under Parliamentary privilege on 27 October 2009:

Mr SIMPKINS (Cowan) (8:49 PM) —It is a great honour to be able to stand in this parliament as an elected representative of the people of Cowan. It is great to be able to stand here and speak with the protection of parliamentary privilege to ensure that I am not restricted in saying what needs to be said. I can talk, and have done so, about the things that matter to my constituents without my right to freedom of speech being restricted. This is a cornerstone of the great democratic tradition. That being said, I do not use parliamentary privilege to tell lies; I use it to tell the truth. If we did not have parliamentary privilege then our ability to tell the truth and convey information would effectively be restricted. The other great advantage of parliamentary privilege is that we cannot be told what we can and cannot say. If we were, that would be censorship and the argument would very clearly be that such censorship would exist to deny us the ability to communicate alternative viewpoints for the benefit of our nation or to deny us the opportunity to be critical of the government in a constructive manner.

Censorship does not exist in the parliament, but in conveying information about what happens here censorship does apply. When I convey information to my constituents, what I need to tell them is censored. The government’s appointed censors in the Department of Finance and Deregulation can tell me that I cannot print certain statements. They tell us that freedom of speech is not allowed. I cannot send my constituents copies of Hansard, the official recording of what is said in this place, if that Hansard record states or implies any words that are critical of the Labor government. The text of this speech, once in Hansard, would be predominantly blacked out by a thick black marker—a marker that serves to eliminate the ability of anyone to engage constructively in a critical debate about government policies and actions.

If I were to say that the Prime Minister was very good at finalising the delivery of quality Howard government projects and programs, and taking credit for them, but hopeless in terms of his own policy performance, that would be censored. I cannot report that in writing. If I were to say that the Deputy Prime Minister’s bungled, over-budget, behind schedule, hopelessly mismanaged—and now under investigation by the Auditor-General—memorial school halls debacle was a fiasco, that would be censored as well. If I were to say that the Minister for Health and Ageing has failed to fix public hospitals by the promised mid-2009 deadline then that would be censored.

If I were to talk about the failure by serial bungler the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy to achieve the original broadband tender at over $4 billion—he is now risking $43 billion of funds borrowed from taxpayers on a broadband plan that has no business plan, which is a very expensive plan without a plan to make sure that taxpayers’ money is spent properly—that would be censored. If I were to say that the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government claimed responsibility for infrastructure projects most of which were initiated by, and many of which were completed by, the previous coalition government then that would be censored. In fact, I do not think that you can even report anything about unauthorised boats arriving in Australian waters, as the mere mention of such an event would be critical of the government and that would be censored.

All these comments would be blacked out. Criticism of the Labor government is not allowed in our letters and newsletters. Bringing the people’s attention to mistakes of the government is no longer allowed in this country. The outlawing of legitimate criticism is occurring now in the printed format by the design of the Labor government, but who knows what the future holds.

I wonder what will be next. Perhaps we will have a list of unparliamentary words expanded so that we can no longer say—in reference to ministers, the Labor Party, State Labor governments, former members of the Labor Party, unions or any other association to do with the Labor Party—words such as ‘bad’, ‘mismanagement’, ‘bungled’, ‘incompetent’, ‘hasty’, ‘knee-jerk’, ‘putting Australia at risk’, or even ‘debt’ or ‘deficit’ et cetera . It is very hard to accurately describe the government without those words.

Perhaps the next step will be that Hansard can be edited to take out any criticisms of the Labor government. Perhaps what is being planned is that standing orders can be modified so that questions or criticisms of the Labor government will, in the future, result in exclusion from the chamber. At least then the Labor government would be able to say that there has not been a bad word said about them in parliament.

This censorship has resulted in the Labor government censors stopping criticism of the government by the opposition in letters or newsletters. The censors are not elected, just directed by the Labor government. These restrictions do not apply to the Prime Minister and ministers in the Labor government, who can continue to use ministerial budgets to criticise the opposition—double standards of the worst kind. This is, without doubt, censorship and an attack on the basic principle of democracy—freedom of speech.

Recently, Dr Clive Spash, a scientist at the CSIRO, was prevented from publishing a paper critical of the Rudd Labor government's emissions trading scheme (ETS). The political interference in research conducted at the CSIRO was raised in Parliament by Eric Abetz, Senator for Tasmania, on 25 November 2009:

It is often in matters of contention and sharp debate that the knowledge and expertise of the scientific community is most valuable. This is why it is so important to protect the right of scientists to speak out about their research and discoveries.’

Going back to that topic of—what was it?—matters of contention, guess what? We have a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme being considered by the parliament as we speak—somewhat contentious—and guess what Dr Spash was writing about? The Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. So by the very test that Senator Carr puts down, he nevertheless puts the censor’s pen through and says, ‘No, we don’t want to hear in any unfettered way what Dr Spash might have to offer not only the government but also the Australian people to help inform them in their debate.’ We do not get the full and detailed treasury modelling on matters to do with the government’s legislation in recent times; we do not get the whole story out of this government.

When you have an institution as proud as the CSIRO being muzzled in this way in the face of a minister who claims that he has been an advocate his whole public life for ‘vigorous and transparent public debate unfettered by political interference’, when you have a minister who says that but then does the exact opposite, you know why he is a cabinet minister in the Rudd government. He fits the mould. That is what the Labor cabinet ministers do: they say one thing, promise one thing and then do another.

Open letter to Australia's Prime Minister from Reporters Sans Frontières

Published at http://www.rsf.org/Open-letter-to-Australia-s-Prime.html:

The Hon Kevin Michael Rudd Prime Minister Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Australia

Paris, 18 December 2009

Dear Prime Minister,

Reporters Without Borders, an organisation that defends free expression worldwide, would like to share with you its concern about your government's plan to introduce a mandatory Internet filtering system. While it is essential to combat child sex abuse, pursuing this draconian filtering project is not the solution. If Australia were to introduce systematic online content filtering, with a relatively broad definition of the content targeted, it would be joining an Internet censors club that includes such countries as China, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Communications minister Stephen Conroy announced on 15 December that, after a year of testing in partnership with Australian Internet service providers (ISPs), your government intended to introduce legislation imposing mandatory filtering of websites with pornographic, paedophile or particularly violent content.

Reporters Without Borders would like to draw your attention to the risks that this plan entails for freedom of expression.

Firstly, the decision to block access to an "inappropriate" website would be taken not by a judge but by a government agency, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Such a procedure, without a court decision, does not satisfy the requirements of the rule of law. The ACMA classifies content secretly, compiling a website blacklist by means of unilateral and arbitrary administrative decision-making. Other procedures are being considered but none of them would involve a judge.

Secondly, the criteria that the proposed law would use are too vague. Filtering would be applied to all content considered "inappropriate," a very slippery term that could be interpreted very differently by different people. In all probability, filtering would target "refused classification" (RC) sites, a category that is extremely controversial as it is being applied to content that is completely unrelated to efforts to combat child sex abuse and sexual violence, representing a dangerous censorship option. Subjects such as abortion, anorexia, aborigines and legislation on the sale of marijuana would all risk being filtered, as would media reports on these subjects.

The choice of filtering techniques has not been clearly defined. Would it be filtering by key-words, URL text or something else? And what about the ISPs that are supposed to carry out the filtering at the government's request? Will they be blamed, will they be accused of complicity in child sex abuse if the filtering proves to be ineffective, as it almost certainly will?

Your government claims that the filtering will be 100 per cent effective but this is clearly impossible. Experts all over the world agree that no filtering system is effective at combating this kind of content. On the one hand, such a system filters sites that should not be affected (such as sites about the psychology of child sexuality or paedophile crime news). And on the other, it fails to filter targeted sites because their URLs contain key-words that are completely unrelated to their content, or because their content (photo and text) is registered under completely neutral terms. Furthermore, people who are determined to visit such sites will know how to avoid the filtering by, for example, using proxy servers or censorship circumvention software or both.

The Wikileaks website highlighted the limitations of such as system when it revealed that the ACMA blacklist of already banned websites contained many with nothing reprehensible in their content. According to Wikileaks, the blacklist included the Abortion TV website, some of the pages of Wikileaks itself, online poker sites, gay networks, sites dealing with euthanasia, Christian sites, a tour operator's site and even a Queensland dentist's site.

The US company Google has also voiced strong reservations. Google Australia's head of policy, Iarla Flynn, said yesterday: "Moving to a mandatory ISP filtering regime with a scope that goes well beyond such material is heavy handed and can raise genuine questions about restrictions on access to information."

As regards paedophilia, the most dangerous places on the Internet are websites offering chat and email services. So if this project were taken to its logical conclusion, access to sites such as Gmail, Yahoo and Skype would also have to be blocked, which would of course be impossible.

There are more effective ways to combat child pornography, including tracking cyber-criminals online (by means of cookies, IP address comparison, and so on), combined with police investigation into suspects and their online habits. Why did your government end the programme launched by the previous government, which made free filtering systems available to Australian families? This procedure had the merit of being adapted to individual needs and gave each home the possibility of shielding its children from porn.

A real national debate is needed on this subject but your communications minister, Stephen Conroy, made such a debate very difficult by branding his critics as supporters of child pornography. An opportunity was lost for stimulating a constructive exchange of ideas.

We also regret the lack of transparency displayed by your government as regards the tests carried out in recent months using procedures that have been kept secret. Your government paid some 300,000 Australian dollars to ISPs to finance the tests. Australian taxpayers have a right to be given detailed information about the results.

Finally, you must be aware that this initiative is a source of a concern for your compatriots. In a recent Fairfax Media poll of 20,000 people, 96 per cent were strongly opposed to such a mandatory Internet filtering system, while around 120,000 Australians have signed a petition against Internet censorship launched by the online activist group GetUp. The withdrawal of this proposal would therefore satisfy public opinion as well as prevent a democratic country from introducing a system that threatens freedom of expression.

I thank you in advance for the consideration you give to our recommendations.

Sincerely,

Jean-François Julliard
Secretary-General

Liberal MPs and senators who have spoken against mandatory ISP-level filtering

Cory Bernardi, Senator for South Australia and Shadow Parliamentary Secretary Assisting the Leader of the Opposition, for The Australian, 6 February 2009:

I identify myself as a social and fiscal conservative and most people who know me would agree with that assessment. As such, one could reasonably expect me to support ISP filtering as a means of ensuring inappropriate content remains unavailable via the internet.

Yet I have grave reservations about the Labor Party proposal on mandatory ISP filtering which is described as a ‘clean feed’ – words that just sugar-coat compulsory censorship of whatever the government deems you are not allowed to see.

Dr Dennis Jensen, Member for Tangney, in the House of Representatives, 14 September 2009:

Computer users, particularly the more tech-savvy—and a special mention must go to the Whirlpool website forums for fostering real debate of the issue—hold the minister as an object of contempt and ridicule, particularly for his bumbling attempt to impose controls over the medium which is ultimately setting the world free. The internet delivers power to the world’s people. It is an ally of all who cherish freedom, individual liberty and true democracy. That is why it is the enemy of authoritarian rulers in countries such as China, Burma and Iran—and, it seems, of the Australian Labor Party.

Members should recall that under the last coalition government we had a very simple, very cost-effective and very popular program under which families could get free copies of an internet filter program for their homes to protect their children from unsavoury internet content. The Rudd government scrapped that, and two years after taking office the minister is still unable to offer an alternative. Delay after delay has very fortunately put this censorship plan on hold, and for this some thanks must go to internet service providers who refused to take part in sham trials.

By now, the members opposite must also have realised how deeply flawed is the internet filter pursued by the minister, and we can only hope that they will quietly abandon it at some stage. What grew from the idea of protecting children using the internet rapidly became billed as a weapon against child pornography, and these are surely two very different issues. From there, the minister has broadened it to propose blocking Australians from viewing any material which a select group of faceless bureaucrats deem inappropriate. And to top it off, the list of banned material would itself be banned from public scrutiny, effectively making the censors unaccountable. IT experts say such a system will slow the network and that it will not work, regardless. This is particularly the case in combating traffic in child pornography, which reportedly is usually distributed through peer-to-peer networks rather than via websites, and so could continue unhindered by the filter.

And so we have a government pledging to spend tens of billions of dollars on a national broadband network of dubious worth which will supposedly offer higher speed data links to all. At the same time, the government is planning a censorship scheme which will have the opposite effect, reducing data speeds and hindering access. And, most crucially, it would stop the free flow of information which we have come to expect from the internet, a strategy more akin to foreign dictatorships, for which Labor feigns distaste, a strategy wholly not in keeping with our country’s proud history of free speech and open debate. The internet promised to take us all into the future, but this government appears intent on applying the policies of the past in its selfish pursuit of power and control, not only in this building but over the lives of all Australians.

Jamie Briggs, Member for Mayo, for The Punch, 27 August 2009:

Proponents of ISP filtering claim it will make it safer. Rubbish. Indeed the ISP filter systems work by closing down access to web addresses after they have been launched. Some claim that this will be as little as 24 hours after the website is launched. Even in the best case scenario it is going to be the old dog chasing its tail.

The ISP filters fail to address online chat rooms, peer to peer connections and emails.

What we have to ask ourselves here is how much are we sacrificing for additional ‘protections’?

The internet surely has dangers but they are so far outweighed by the enormous educational, economic and social benefits that we should be very wary of allowing our Government to attempt to regulate it.

If parents want to protect their children from the nasties, they should. We should be telling parents, like not talking to strangers, that the Government cannot protect you from every danger in the world and that you must take responsibility for your children’s safety.

There is a massive risk with this false promise that we will start to walk down a very dangerous path of censorship that can’t end well.

Simon Birmingham, Senator for South Australia, for The Punch, 10 November 2009:

Somehow, when promising to clean up the internet, they forgot to say what exactly it was they were going to protect kids from. Cyber bullying? Information about drugs, suicide or cults? Pornography perhaps? Surely kids shouldn’t be seeing any of these things online. Lucky for mum and dad Uncle Kev is on the case cleaning up the net.

Or is he? Ever since Labor announced its policy I’ve been trying to find out exactly what would be blocked. The story appears to have changed month by month – sometimes it’s all pornography, sometimes X rated material, sometimes inappropriate content. But now it seems to be stuff that’s already illegal – content that has been Refused Classification.

So while mum and dad are busy cooking dinner and Uncle Kev is meant to be looking after the kids on the internet, they will still be able to access pornography, information about drugs and unsuspectingly chat away with goodness knows who in chat rooms – hardly being kept safe from inappropriate content!

Originally the government proposed a very broad filter that would provide a ‘clean feed’ to each and every internet user, whether you wanted it or not. The notion of a ‘clean feed’ that protects children from “harmful and inappropriate online material” would have been a compulsory ISP level filter of such scale that China and Iran might have felt a little filter envy.

However, many experts believe a compulsory ISP level filter would result in the decimation of internet speeds and force serious restrictions on free speech. The more you filter, the greater the impact on speeds. And, the more you try to filter, the more likely you are to block access to material that law-abiding adults would legitimately want to access.

Michael Johnson, Member for Ryan and Opposition Whip, in a media release, 17 December 2009:

The frightening question is where will Rudd’s state censorship and government intrusion into the privacy of our lives end? We have seen Mr Rudd try to make homebirths illegal and take away the right of women to choose the place of giving birth and recently attempted reprehensible muzzling of Opposition Members of Parliament from criticizing the Federal Government.

The arguments against Labor’s ISP filtering censorship plan are compelling. I believe there are many arguments to support my position:

1. The ISP filter will provide a false sense of security. Antivirus is a prime example – as much protection as we load onto our computers and networks we access, there are always new viruses, worms and trojans gaining access and creating havoc.
2. The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) already has the responsibility for issuing take-down notices for black-listed content hosted in Australia. This Service Provider Responsibility List can be accessed at: http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_90157
3. There are already tools available for parents in commercial form which are just as foolproof as this ISP filtering plan, but don’t equate to censorship. These come in the forms of personal internet filters, parental control software and remote monitoring.
4. Parents should be providing their children with the educational resources and know how to support the disciplinary responsibilities not only they, but their children, must be aware of when using the internet.
5. Even with the ISP filtering plan in action, it will not protect your child from online chat rooms, peer to peer connections or emails.

Alex Hawke, Member for Mitchell, to ZDNet Australia, 18 December 2009:

I'm inherently against this concept, it's a very bad way to do governance.

I'm a Christian and I have spoken to the Christian lobby and told them that this policy will not be effective. It could even potentially lead to some of their views being added to a government filter.

I don't think they're open to the danger of this policy mechanism. It will go beyond [child pornography] and that's where it could run into trouble. I'm going to be arguing strongly inside the liberal party that we should oppose this policy.

Rudd Labor government censors results from ISP filtering trial

Crucial information on the Rudd Labor government's trial of ISP-level content filtering is conspicuously absent in the Enex TestLab report. Senator Stephen Conroy, Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, has failed to disclose the rate of over-blocking that occurs when the filter is configured with the ACMA blacklist. While the report includes results on the degree of over-blocking and under-blocking for a list of URLs provided by Enex, the figures for over-blocking for the ACMA blacklist are more important as this is the list that ISPs will be required to block when mandatory ISP-level filtering is in force.

The reality of Internet content filtering is that as the success rate for blocking of prescribed prohibited content increases, so too does the over-blocking of legitimate content, as Enex makes clear in its own report:

Enex considers it unlikely that any filter vendor would achieve 100 percent blocking of the URLs inappropriate for children without significant over-blocking of the innocuous URLs because the content on different commercial lists varies and there is a high rate at which new content is created on the internet. Enex has also noted, through previous testing, that the higher the accuracy the higher the over-blocking.

Enex reported that they were successful in blocking 100% of the pages listed on the ACMA blacklist, but what was the price paid in blocking of legitimate content? Even though the Minister has not released this information, he is proceeding with the implementation of ISP-level content filtering without consulting the Australian people on whether they are prepared to accept the negative impact it will have on the accessibility of the vast majority of sites on the Internet that do not pose a threat to children.

Mandatory ISP-level filtering: issue of feasibility or freedom of speech?

Most disagreements I've had on the issue of mandatory ISP-level filtering are not on whether it is bad policy, but the reasons why it is bad policy. The community's concerns fall into two categories:

• Social: objections to government regulation of access to online content.
• Technical: foreseen technical challenges that ISP-level filtering creates, such as preventing circumvention and a reduction in network performance.

Engineers will tell you that ISP-level filtering simply doesn't work, which might appear to contradict the fears that people have about the government being able to block access to content to further its own political interests. The social and technical arguments at first may appear to disagree with each other, but they are closely related and can be even seen as one and the same issue being debated from different angles.

The success of the Internet has been built on its open, decentralised and robust design that has enabled its rapid expansion and information to quickly and reliably flow from one host on the network to any other host located anywhere on the globe. Attempting to regulate communications requires intervention in the fundamental underlying workings of the Internet and inevitably leads to undesirable results. Whether you view this from a social or technical perspective, the policy undermines the strengths of the Internet that have allowed it to transform the way we communicate.

Proponents of Internet censorship sometimes compare the Internet to TV in the censorship debate—programs are censored on free-to-air television, so why should the Internet be treated any differently? The difference is that free-to-air programs are delivered over a broadcast medium and communication occurs in only one direction between the station and the public. When programs are censored, the content is removed at the source. Censorship on the Internet via ISP-level filtering is achieved by blocking communication between hosts connected to the Internet, not removing the content at the source, and has an adverse impact on all communication that takes place between Internet users.

WAIA President's two opposing positions on ISP-level filtering

Richard Bone, President of the WA Internet Association, appears to have a good understanding of the inherent flaws of using ISP-level filtering to regulate content on the Internet, as he wrote in an article for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute:

1. It is not an effective way to block or stop the content that it is designed to prevent.
2. Filters can be bypassed. This would be particularly relevant in radicalisation networks where the participants form a relationship with each other which could involve sharing of techniques to bypass filters.
3. The introduction of (arguably ineffective) filters will increase the costs to ISPs and impede their ability to provide superior performance. This will ultimately lead to higher costs and lower performance for consumers.
4. Legislative change is far too slow to be effective. For example, the time to introduce filtering legislation, or revisions to such legislation is months or years whereas technology to bypass and/or avoid filters would occur in days or even hours.
5. The introduction of filtering legislation would be an impediment to investment and innovation in the Australian internet industry. It is already the case that the lack of safe harbour legislation for hosts within Australia drives Australian content to be hosted offshore. If filtering is introduced this will worsen.

He clearly understands that ISP-level filtering won't work and law enforcement is a better policy alternative:

In forming counter-radicalisation policy it should be remembered that the internet provides a tool to help humans communicate better and more easily. It is a facility that underpins a human activity system. As part of a human activity system, the internet evolves often very rapidly to trends driven by human behaviour. The internet is resistant to impediment—where changes are introduced they are often quickly circumvented.

From an industry perspective, the best way to fight radicalisation is to use human law enforcement, equipped with state-of-the-art technology, assisted by the Australian internet industry.

Despite writing the above for the strategic policy think tank, he publicly stated his support for the government's plan for mandatory ISP-level filtering:

This initiative will help reduce access to significant amounts of harmful content.

It is difficult to see how he was giving an open, honest opinion on this ill-conceived policy after making the earlier remarks for the ASPI.

The politics of stupidity: Cyber Safety likely to go the way of FuelWatch

The government requires the support of all 7 cross-benchers in the Senate to pass a bill opposed by the Coalition. A vote of no by any one of these senators can sink the government's bill, which puts them in a powerful position. This is how the FuelWatch scheme was killed off.

The cross-benchers are as follows:

Australian Greens

• Bob Brown - Senator for Tasmania
• Christine Milne - Senator for Tasmania
• Rachel Siewert - Senator for Western Australia
• Sarah Hanson-Young - Senator for South Australia
• Scott Ludlam - Senator for Western Australia

Family First Party

• Steve Fielding - Senator for Victoria

Independent

• Nick Xenophon - Senator for South Australia

The Greens, who have described the plan as "daft", will almost certainly vote against this legislation.

The positions of Senator Fielding and Senator Xenophon are unclear, but they support the idea of Internet censorship. Senator Fielding is the most likely to vote in favour of the filter because of his party's socially conservative values.

Links

• Conroy's internet filtering trials must not remain secret—Liberal Party of Australia
• Cory's Comment - ISP Filtering—Cory Bernardi, Liberal Senator for South Australia

Google fails Chinese government: not all 1 trillion pages clean

It appears Google has failed to meet the expectations of the Chinese government. Indeed, the search engine's results still contain links to pornographic material.

Filtering out the pages that violate China's online policy from the 1 trillion that have been indexed by their search engine is no trivial task. Maybe the government of China thinks that Google employs lots of little men who surf the Internet around the clock and check the appropriateness of the content of each page as they index them.

It is difficult to imagine how Google will be able to sustain its business in China. Presently, technology for automatically distinguishing between pornographic material and non-pornographic material is at best highly unreliable and slow.

Government ignores its own study on ISP level filtering

A report on the feasibility of ISP level content filtering has been released that clearly highlights the inherent flaws of the government's planned Internet filtering scheme. The government's disregard for its own policy advice is a concern in itself.

The key findings are as follows:

Key Finding 1
There is a need for a clear policy on the goals of any filtering system that might be implemented.

Key Finding 2
The focus of the study was on content available in the form of web pages on the World Wide Web. This does not fully reflect the current dynamics of Internet based media.

Key Finding 3
Australia has a very heterogeneous ISP industry. Depending on the nature of a mandated filtering function, the impact on industry may be significant.

Key Finding 4
The industry is not well prepared for the implementation of content filtering systems. Our findings show that there is great disparity in the vision of how such systems should be implemented and the perceived level of difficulty in implementation.

Key Finding 5
There are many important legal and general business aspects that need to be addressed before a decision can be made on a filtering implementation. Frameworks need to be in place to ensure that the legal aspects and responsibility are adequately addressed.

Key Finding 6
It is evident that there are significant technical problems surrounding dynamic content filtering and its implementation in a nationwide ISP-based content filtering system. Current technology is unlikely to yield efficient and economically viable solutions for this purpose.
Furthermore, the problem is of a nature that requires a research effort before firm conclusions can be drawn on its effectiveness. As the accuracy of this form of filtering is still not high it could be expected that allowed content would be blocked inadvertently. For example, if child pornography is to be blocked, other pornographic content may also be blocked. Conversely, if all pornographic content is to be blocked, other content with a 'resemblance' in features will also be blocked; e.g. sex education, medical information, erotic content etc.

The report makes the following recommendations:

• Define the objectives of filtering;
• Consider applying the above objectives to a national filtering scheme with particular attention to be given to:
  • The role and scope of a filtering scheme;
  • The implementation options: i.e. ISPs either implementing their own filtering capability or utilising a national filtering service (refer to Key Finding 4).
  • The blacklist sources. International sources, such as INHOPE or the Internet Watch Foundation might be considered in conjunction with the ACMA blacklist;
  • The opt in/opt out framework. In particular, consider the implications of making the framework optional for ISPs;
  • The implications of making the national filtering scheme voluntary for the ISP industry, in line with international precedence.
• Engage with industry to clarify how such a scheme would:
  • Interface with existing ISP infrastructure;
  • Impact on broadband performance;
  • Impact on costs;
  • Handle the issue of recovery of costs to industry as a result of implementation.
• Undertake analysis to determine how vulnerable a national filtering scheme is to circumvention and to attempts to disable it.
• Consult relevant stakeholders regarding the management of the nationwide scheme. Issues to consider include:
  • The legal aspects of such a scheme;
  • Compliance with Australian legislation;
  • Complaint procedures for incorrectly classified content;
  • The scope of filtering (to be undertaken in consultation with the general public): what is to be filtered; how often is filtering to be applied; how often will filter lists be updated and provided to ISPs; and
  • How will content be classified; what levels of transparency, scalability and security will apply to the classification process.
• Mobile Internet service providers should be included in the consultation and planning activities.

Child Wise's fundamentally flawed argument for Internet filtering

One organisation that backs the federal government's plans to censor the Internet is Child Wise. Bernadette McMenamin, CEO of Child Wise, uses the following statistics to justify her position in a media release:

Reports show that these filters are very effective, with the UK system operated by British Telecom blocking over 35,000 attempts per day. During 2006, the Norwegian system blocked 1.7million attempts to access child pornography. The Swedish system blocked 15,000 attempts during its first few weeks of operation and resulted in a 40% drop in reports of child pornographic sites to ECPAT Sweden's Internet hotline. Telenor, a large European mobile phone operator, has been filtering child pornography on their 3G phones since June 2005. Each country uses their local authorities such as the police to determine what sites are blocked.

These statistics are quite misleading. The "40% drop in reports of child pornographic sites" is rather meaningless—it states nothing about the impact on the distribution of child pornography via peer-to-peer file sharing, which is the typical method that is used to share illegal content on the Internet. The big entertainment companies certainly understand this and they have fought to protect their sales by taking legal action against the makers of peer-to-peer file sharing software. Studies show that peer-to-peer traffic consumes a large percentage of Internet bandwidth. According to a report released by Sandvine, peer-to-peer traffic consumes 61% of upstream bandwidth and 22% of downstream bandwidth. Also, one doesn't need any technical expertise to realise that the number of illegal sites reported cannot be used as a performance measure on its own as we are unable to compare it to the total number of illegal sites that are in operation, which probably dwarf those that are discovered and reported. The same can be said about the "1.7million attempts to access child pornography", but what makes this figure more deceptive is that it only includes accesses to known illegal sites using a server-based protocol; it does not include accesses via peer-to-peer file sharing.

There is no doubting that Ms McMenamin has the welfare of children at heart in her efforts to introduce ISP level filtering across the board, but her case is fundamentally flawed.

Ms McMenamin provides contact details for media enquires on Child Wise's website:

Bernadette McMenamin AO
Chief Executive Officer
Phone:  +61 3 9645 8911
Mobile: +61 419 397 689
Fax:    +61 3 9645 8922
E-mail: office@childwise.net

Australia's leadership on the digital economy

Government's plan to censor the Internet will be a waste of money

The Australian government's plans to censor the Internet by blocking access to selected websites will achieve little except increase the costs of Internet services while degrading performance. Anyone with a basic understanding of how the Internet is constructed will tell you that any attempt to restrict users' access to sites across the globe will fail. The Internet owes its remarkable success to its decentralisation, open architecture and adaptiveness, and for these reasons it is futile to attempt to regulate users' access to data that is normally accessible by the general public.

The cliché "it is better than doing nothing" does not justify this dumb policy, because the time and money spent implementing the filter can be put to better use in other approaches to combating child pornography, such as law enforcement, where the perpetrators are actually identified and prosecuted, not ignored (of course, this would mean more money would have to come out of the government's own budget, rather than that of ISPs).

So, how easy would it be to circumvent the Internet filter? Here is one way it can be done in two simple steps:

1. Browse to an anonymous public web proxy hosted overseas, such as Vtunnel.
2. Enter the URL of the desired site and click Begin browsing.

Some will argue that this loophole can be overcome by simply blacklisting anonymous web proxies, but this is just one method and there are countless other ways that Internet filters can be circumvented, such as VPN, SSH and various other SSL-based tunnelling methods, as well as freely available technologies developed solely for this purpose. Furthermore, if anonymous web proxies were blacklisted, Australian Internet users would justifiably be outraged because it would be encroaching upon their basic right to online privacy, which unfortunately does not exist when traffic is unencrypted.

Most of the individuals who are determined to obtain or distribute child pornography via the Internet would be well aware of the severe penalties and shame for their crimes and would already be adopting measures to avoid detection, making it difficult to maintain up-to-date lists of sites providing such material. We do not know how much of this material is downloaded via server-based systems. Users obtaining child pornography through decentralised file sharing networks will be totally unaffected by filters that only target dedicated servers.

The intentions might be good (we should hope so), but the end does not justify the means, especially when the end will not be achieved.

Links

• Cerf sees government control of Internet failing - Reuters
• Free Anonymous Surfing, Free Anonymous Proxies
• HOWTO bypass Internet Censorship
• Rudd porn filter fails: experts
• Senator the Hon. Stephen Conroy
• Wikipedia: Internet censorship - Circumvention